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THE NEW ANTITRUST: A "STRUCTURAL" APPROACH
CHARLES E. MUELLERt
[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both
when they are right and when they are wrong, are more pow-
erful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled
by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some
academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the
power of vested interests is greatly exaggerated compared
with the gradual encroachment of ideas .... [S] oon or late,





A GREAT DEAL has been said about the power of "an idea whose
time has come" and even a little about the tenacity of some whose
time has already come and gone. Indeed, that consummate champion
of the new idea, Lord Keynes, added to his other contributions the
somewhat disquieting thought that it was not the old ideas themselves
that had to die off before the new could forge ahead, but their pro-
ponents: "[I]n the field of economic and political philosophy there are
not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five
or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and poli-
ticians and even agitators apply -to current events are not likely to be
the newest."' The new idea frequently faces, then, what one might call,
to borrow a phrase, the "generation gap."
Happily, however, there are exceptions; a few civil servants and
politicians, not to mention "agitators," are influenced by new theories
after their twenty-fifth birthday. In the world of antitrust, for example,
a theory not fully developed until 19562 has already - a mere decade
later - exerted considerably more than a passing influence on the
thinking of our Supreme Court Justices, men that were, to put it
t Attorney, Federal Trade Commission. LL.B., DePaul University, 1955. (The
views expressed herein are the author's only and not necessarily those of the Com-
mission.)
1. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY op EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
383-84 (1936).
2. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEW COMPETITION (1956).
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THE NEW ANTITRUST
mildly, generally somewhat older than twenty-five in that year. Indeed,
it has recently been suggested that the Court's current antitrust de-
cisions, particularly its merger opinions from 1962 onward,' reflect a
more studied adherence to that theory "than to past precedent" itself.4
The "practical" effect has also been considerable. "Antitrust," as one
commentator aptly puts it, "has not been the same since."5
The essence of this new approach to antitrust is actually not so
much the abandonment of old ideas that were in some sense "wrong"
and the adoption of new ideas that are "right," as it is, rather, some-
thing of a shift of emphasis, a reorientation or refocusing of the inquiry
to get at, and attempt to gain some understanding of, important market
forces that had successfully eluded older tools of analysis. In substance,
this shift of emphasis is away from an almost exclusive preoccupation
by antitrust with certain surface features of business "conduct" and
toward a more narrow, but much deeper, inquiry into market "struc-
ture," those features of the business environment that are believed to be
the underlying causes of commercial conduct. It is not that there is
less concern today with the symptoms; it is simply that there is an
increased interest in identifying the diseases that lie behind them.
II. THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ANTITRUST
There are three basic approaches to what is traditionally called
the "monopoly problem." These are (1) the "structural" approach,
(2) the "conduct" approach, and (3) the "performance" approach.
While the principal differences are largely matters of emphasis - each
of the three generally concedes, for example, the relevance of the factors
emphasized by the other -two - those differences are substantial enough
to critically affect the outcome of particular cases and, in the aggregate,
the over-all course of antitrust policy throughout the economy as a
whole.
Stated in its most forceful form, the "structuralist" position is that
"an industry which does not have a competitive structure will not have
competitive behavior."' A chain of causation is posited, one that runs
3. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) ; United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,
384 U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) ; United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
376 U.S. 665 (1964) ; United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) ;
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
4. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts - From
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 298 (1967).
5. Id. at 288.
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from structure-to--conduct-to-performance. Structure' determines con-
duct,8 and conduct determines performance.9  For example, high con-
centration and high barriers to entry (both structural features) are said
to be conducive to price fixing (a form of behavior or conduct), which
leads to artificially inflated prices and profit margins (an aspect of in-
dustry performance). In this view, most of the socially undesirable
business practices involved in antitrust litigation are seen not so much
as the doings of "bad men," acting out of socially reprehensible personal
motives, as they are the fairly predictable activities of quite reasonable
decision makers who are simply following the logic of profit maximiza-
tion along corridors rather clearly marked out by the basic structural
features of their markets.
7. "Structure" refers to those relatively permanent features of a market that
are beyond the short-run control of the individual firm and that thus constitute the
walls or banks that restrain or limit its competitive actions. The most significant
structural features are said to be (1) the degree of "concentration" and (2) "barriers
to entry." The first, concentration, refers to the number and site distribution of the
firms in the market. Its competitive significance is said to lie in the fact that, as the
number of firms decreases and the percentage of the total market held by each
increases, the probability of their recognizing their "mutual interdependence" - and
starting to price like collective monopolists rather than independent competitors -
begins to increase significantly at some critical point.
The second structural feature, barriers to entry, refers to obstacles that
impose on newcomers higher costs per unit than those encountered by the established
firms, or disadvantages that compel newcomers to sell their product for a lower price
per unit than established firms can get for a product of comparable quality. These
are said to fall into three general categories, (1) "absolute cost disadvantages," (2)"product differentiation disadvantages," and (3) "scale economy disadvantages." See
BAIN, BARRIERS To Nrw COMPETITION 12 (1956). For example, one of the "absolute"
cost disadvantages sometimes encountered by the new entrant is the inability to buy
supplies, materials, and other input factors at as low a price as the larger established
firms can secure, i.e., discriminatory pricing. Id. at 14-16. The significance of entry
barriers is that they permit established firms to raise their prices above a competitive
level without drawing in on them a horde of newcomers that would otherwise be
expected to enter and force the price back down to the competitive level.
8. The term "conduct," in definitions distinguishing it from structure and per-
formance, refers to those actions taken by the businessman as part of his competitive
strategy. In particular, it is concerned with those actions that reflect the basis on
which he is making his price and output decisions, particularly (a) whether he is
making those decisions independently or collusively (collusive in the economic sense,
including, in addition to overt agreements, the nonindependence inherent in the
oligopoly relationship, that is, "oligopolistic interdependence") and whether (b) he
is, though acting noncollusively, engaging in predatory or exclusionary practices
against his competitors, his suppliers, or his customers. Most of the practices chal-
lenged by the antitrust and trade regulation laws - price fixing and other forms
of collusion, and price discrimination, exclusive dealing, and other such predatory or
exclusionary activities - are included in the term "conduct."
9. "Performance" refers to the economic results produced by business "conduct,"
i.e., the firm's or the industry's contribution to the economy's over-all (a) efficiency
in production and distribution, (b) maintenance of full employment with price
stability, (c) achievement of a high rate of progress in technology and productivity,
and (d) equity in the distribution of income. See CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY:
STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 95 (1964). Particular attention is generally
devoted to two of these in antitrust, "efficiency" and "progressiveness." Efficiency is
evaluated largely in terms of whether competition is sufficiently intense to compel
costs and prices to absolute minima; progressiveness is thought of primarily in terms
of the number and importance of the inventions and innovations the firm or industry
has introduced, as compared with what it optimally could have produced. See generally
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 342 (1959) ; KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY
62-70 (1959) [hereinafter cited KAvSEN & TURNER].
[VOL. 12 : p. 764
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The structuralists are prepared to admit that industry structure
is not the sole determinant of business conduct. For example, war,
depression, and other such forces external to the market itself can
exert a powerful influence on commercial behavior. Notwithstand-
ing these limitations, however, this school of thought considers the
basic structural contours of an industry so significant an influence on
the conduct of the individual firms in it that they would, in the last
analysis, give it decisive weight in determining whether an industry is
likely to prove effectively competitive over the long run. For example,
if a particular merger is shown to have adversely affected the industry's
structure - to have increased concentration or raised barriers to entry
- the structuralists would not excuse it on a showing of either good
conduct or good performance - or on a showing of both good conduct
and good performance. They would take the position that, the com-
pelling pressures of the structural factors being what they are, the
long-run probabilities are preponderantly against any serious chances
for effectively competitive conduct and performance to endure in an
anticompetitively structured industry.
The essence of this position derives from the fundamental premise
of economic reasoning that, other things being equal, men prefer more
income to less, and hence that reasonable predictions can be made about
their probable future courses of action if it can first be determined
which of several alternatives would be most likely to yield the largest
profits. With profit maximization as the guide to the courses of action
business firms can reasonably be expected to take - that is, if it can
reasonably be assumed that the individual firm will not knowingly
choose a course that reduces its earnings when there is available a lawful
alternative that will enhance them - it can then be said that -the role
of market structure as a key factor in determining conduct is clear.
A firm that belongs to a competitively structured market will maximize
its profits by continuing to expand its output up to the point where it
earns no more than a normal or competitive rate of return. A firm that
belongs to an oligopolistically structured market, on the other hand,
will recognize the fact that its price and output decisions can affect the
entire market and hence will maximize its profits by following its
fellow oligopolists in restricting output below, and charging a price
above, the level -that would have prevailed had the market been struc-
tured competitively.'" In other words, the kind of conduct a firm must
10. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933); ROBIN-
SON, ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933). See also Olson & McFarland,
The Restoration of Pure Monopoly and The Concept of the Industry, 76 Q.J. ECON.
613 (1962).
The most important distinguishing feature of a market with a large number of
firms . . . is that the individual firms in such a market have an incentive to act
SU MMER 1967]
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss4/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 12: p. 764
follow in order to maximize its profits is determined in very substantial
part by the way in which its market is structured. It follows that, once
the structure of a market is known, and if it can reasonably be assumed
that the firms in it are rationally attempting to maximize their profits,
then meaningful predictions can be made as to the kind of conduct
patterns they are most likely to pursue."
The "conduct' '1 2 approach to antitrust emphasizes the fact that
business firms are directed by individual human beings, that humans
differ widely in their "psychological" makeup, and hence that there is
no valid reason for believing that a particular "stimulus" - to use the
language of the psychology fraternity - will produce the same pattern
of response ("conduct") in different businessmen. Therefore, in this
view, the mere fact that the structure of a market is such that it confers
on its members both the power and the incentive to abandon competitive
conduct doesn't mean they will necessarily do so. While this would
admittedly be the "rational" course of action, the powerful incentive of
in opposition to the interests of the group or industry, even to the extent that in
equilibrium there are no [excess] profits. . . . [Ilncreases in output will continue
to be profitable for each individual firm even after the . . . total revenue of all
firms taken together is decreasing. This process continues until, in equilibrium,
there are no [excess] profits. . . . [T]he net result is that all firms are worse off,
but not because any firm has failed to act in its own self-interest. If a firm,
foreseeing the fall in price resulting from the increase in industry output, were to
restrict its own output, it would lose more than ever, for the price it received
would fall quite as much in any case and it would have a smaller output as well....
Therefore, in any market with large numbers ...the firms act in opposition
to their common interest in higher profits for the group with the result that in
equilibrium there are no [excess] profits. This paradoxical consequence comes
about because the effects of the individual firm's actions are so small in relation
to the market that no one firm in the industry is significantly affected by them....
The very absence of this condition has always been used to describe oligopoly.
In an oligopolistic market, by definition, a firm's action will significantly affect
competing firms, so a firm has to take other firms' reactions into account in
making its own decisions. In an oligopolistic market, as is well known, if one
firm increases its output and cuts its price, this will have a noticeable effect on
other firms in the group, and may induce them also to cut prices and increase
output, leaving all of the firms including the one which first cut its price worse
off than before. Foreseeing this, the first firm may not cut price, and the oligo-
polistic industry may in equilibrium have positive [excess] profits because the
firms may have an incentive to forego actions not consistent with the interests
of the group. Id. at 616-19. (Emphasis added.)
11. In support of the proposition that concentration leads to super-competitive
profit rates see, e.g., BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 411 (1959) ; F.T.C., Relation-
ship Between Market Structure and Profits, TECHNICAL STUDY No. 8 - NATIONAL
COMM'N OF FOOD MARKETING, THin STRUCTURE o' FOOD MANUFACTURING 202 (1966) ;
Collins & Preston, Concentration and Price-Cost Margins in Food Manufacturing
Industries, 14 J. ov INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 226 (1966) ; Mann, Seller Concentra-
tion, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return of Thirty Industries, 1950-1960, 48 Rlv.
ov ECONOMICS & STATISTICS 296 (1966).
In the FTC's Food Manufacturing study, for example, the Commission's staff
found that, in those industries where the four largest firms held 50%-65% of total
industry sales, average profits were approximately twice as high as they were in
those industries where the four largest had only 35%-50%; and in the still more
concentrated industries (four largest firms with 75% or more), average profits were
nearly three times the rate in the most competitively structured groups. THX STRUC-
TURE oF FOOD MANUFACTURING, supra at 207.
12. See note 8 supra.
768
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profit-maximization may be more than offset by certain other induce-
ments, particularly some that, while perhaps irrational from the stand-
point of the firm's owners or stockholders, are quite consistent with the
interests of its managers. The latter may have, for example, a keen
sense of social responsibility, one that might lead them to charge a price
that is considerably less .than the most profitable price they could charge,
thus deliberately sacrificing the stockholders' interest in higher profits
to the consuming public's interest in lower prices. Or a firm's manage-
ment might be particularly concerned about its standing in -the line of
Fortune's 500, where rank is determined ,by dollar sales, and thus choose
to push its volume far enough out front to depress prices well below
the profit-maximizing point in many of its markets. The central idea
in all of these arguments is substantially ,the same, however. As long
as -there are at least two businessmen making decisions in a market,
according to this reasoning, there is always the possibility that they
might ignore the mutual monetary interests of their respective firms and
engage in more competitive rivalry than is forced on them by the
structural constraints of that market; the mere existence of the power to
restrict output and charge noncompetitive prices does not necessarily
mean that it will be used.
The "performance" approach to antitrust is one that is perhaps
better known to lawyers working in this area by 'the more compre-
hensive title, "workable competition." This latter term actually in-
cludes, however, a great deal more than the concepts advanced by the
proponents of the "performance" school. Indeed, if workable competi-
tion is defined as the closest feasible real-world approximation to the
competitive model, as it is frequently so defined,1" then even the "struc-
turalists" could perhaps subscribe to it. But when workable competition
is identified with the "performance" approach exclusively, or even
13. A few members stress that the "doctrine" of workable competition is only
a rough and ready judgment by some economists, each for himself, that a par-
ticular industry is performing reasonably well - presumably relative to industrial
arrangements which are practically attainable. There are no objective criteria
of workable competition, and such criteria as are proffered are at best in-
tuitively reasonable modifications of the rigorous and abstract criteria of
perfect competition.
ATT'v GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REp. 339 (1955).
Since its formulation by J. M. Clark in a paper presented to the American
Economic Association and the Econometric Society in 1939 (Clark, Toward a
Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. Eco. Rpv. 241 (1940)), a voluminous
body of literature has developed around the notion of "workable competition." See,
e.g., Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition,
in A.E.A. READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION & PUBLIC POLICY 83 (Heflebower
& Stocking ed. 1958) ; Sosnick, A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition,
72 Q.J. Eco. 380 (1958) ; Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, in A.E.A. READINGS,
supra at 352; Mason, The New Competition in BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY 282 (Levin ed. 1958) ; Stocking, On the Concept of Workable Competition as
an Antitrust Guide, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 3 (1956-1957) ; Adams, The "Rule of Reason":
Workable Competition or Workable Monopoly, 63 YALE L.J. 348 (1954).
SUMMER 1967]
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primarily, it takes on a quite different character. In substance, this
latter approach denies that there is a significant causal relation between
market structure, on the one hand, and conduct and performance, on the
other. In this view, the antitrust authorities and the courts should go
to the end of the chain and examine directly the matter that is really
of primary interest to society, namely, performance. If performance is
good, then, by definition, all of the market forces that are worth
worrying about, including competition, are obviously functioning in a
"workable" manner. The premise here is that an industry's structure
and conduct, insofar as they are socially relevant at all, are to be in-
ferred from its performance, not the other way around. The idea, in
short, is 'that "by their fruits ye shall know them."
The practical effects of such a standard can be analyzed only by
examining the specific factors that it would emphasize. Thus, the term
"performance," as noted above, refers to society's four major economic
goals: (1) efficiency in production and distribution; (2) full employ-
ment with price stability; (3) high rates of progress in technology and
productivity; and (4) equity in the distribution of income. 4 Two of
these - efficiency and progressiveness - are particularly relevant in
evaluating the arguments for the "performance" approach to antitrust.5
The first, "efficiency," has long been one of the more clearly expressed
objectives of our national antitrust policy, the premise being that there
is a positive correlation between the intensity of the competition in a
market, on the one hand, and its over-all efficiency in serving the con-
sumer's needs, on the other. It can be shown, for example, that under
the "perfect competition" type of market structure, all three components
of price - production costs, selling costs, and profits' 6 - will be kept
at an absolute technological minimum, thus simultaneously conserving
society's scarce resources and giving consumers the goods they want
most urgently at the lowest possible prices.
14. See CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 95
(1964).
15. As to the role of antitrust in maintaining price stability, see ECONOMIC REPoRT
oP THE PRESIDENT 114 (1967):
The antitrust statutes assume particular importance in an economy operating
near the limits of its capacity. Their vigorous enforcement can counter a possible
inflationary bias in product markets by sustaining and strengthening competition.
Antitrust activities should continue to be focused on this main purpose. In par-
ticular, effective antitrust cannot provide for the protection of individual com-
petitors at the expense of the protection of competition. Ibid.
16. These are the three aspects of performance Bain considers of common
interest and importance in every industry:
(1) the degree of efficiency attained, so far as this is affected by the scales
of plants and firms and the rates at which facilities are utilized;
(2) the relation of price to cost as reflected in the rates of profit earned on
owners' investment; and
(3) the size of sales-promotion costs, relative to total sales revenue.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 342 (1959). See also KAYSEN & TURNER 62-70.
[VOL. 12 : p. 764
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The second major category of performance characteristics, "pro-
gressiveness," refers to the rate at which an industry is inventing and
discovering new techniques and technology ("invention") and applying
them or introducing them into commercial use ("innovation")." In
traditional economic theory, the premise here has been the same as that
underlying the question of efficiency, namely, that the spur of competi-
tion is conducive to invention and innovation, whereas the "dead hand
of monopoly" produces complacency and a general dulling of the in-
ventive and innovating spirit. As the Supreme Court said in 1958:
"[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained inter-
action of competitive forces will yield ,the 'best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress .. ."1S
The "performance" approach to antitrust reflects a fundamental
skepticism about the connection between structure, on the one hand,
and industry performance, on the other. This skepticism centers par-
ticularly on the second aspect of performance, progressiveness. There is
relatively little dispute on the proposition that the pressures exerted on
the individual firm by a competitive industry structure (many firms,
easy entry, and so forth) are more likely 'to result in optimum efficiency
(e.g., minimum costs and mark-ups) than would those of an oligopo-
listic or monopolistic structure. There is profound disagreement, how-
ever, on the question of whether there is a positive association between
competition and progressiveness (high rate of invention and innova-
tion). Indeed, some assert that there is a negative association - that
some degree of monopoly power is absolutely essential if firms are to
have the incentive and wherewithal to engage in the expensive and
time-consuming research and development programs that alone can
produce inventive and innovative progress. Where there is easy entry,
for example, there is said to be little incentive to engage in research
and development, because there will be insufficient time between the
innovation and the entry of newcomers to permit the innovator to
recoup, via excess or noncompetitive profits, the amounts initially
expended in bringing out the innovation. Furthermore, funds for re-
search and development are almost entirely dependent upon accumula-
tions of monopoly profits from past operations, this being based upon
the premise that competition forces the distribution of profits to either
17. The development and introduction of improved production techniques
generally involves two distinguishable stages of human activity: invention or
discovery of new techniques, which thus become available for use by business
firms, and innovation of newly discovered and available techniques, which involves
actually applying them in production or introducing them into commercial use.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 394-95 (1959).
18. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
SUMMER 1967]
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stockholders (in the form of dividends) or -to customers (in the form
of lower prices), and hence leaves nothing for management to put into
such speculative adventures as research and development. It is said
to follow, therefore, that monopoly must be tolerated, and even wel-
comed, as a handmaiden to economic progress.
The significance of this argument for antitrust lies primarily in
the further fact that, as between the benefits of "efficiency," on the one
hand, and "progressiveness," on the other, a fairly persuasive case can
be made for the proposition that the public interest in the latter is by
far the greater of the two. There can be no doubt about the role of
invention and innovation as perhaps the major factor in the country's
enormous growth in productivity, and hence in the general standard of
living, over the past two centuries. 9 Nor can there be much doubt
about the fact that competition in this area - in the development of
that which is new - is a form of competition of immense social value,
in some cases, perhaps, of even greater value than price competition:
[The competition that counts is] the competition from the new
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new
type of organization - competition which commands a decisive
cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins
of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their
foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as
much more effective than -the other as a bombardment is in com-
petition with forcing a door, and so much more important that it
becomes a matter of comparative indifference whether competition
in the ordinary sense functions more or less promptly; the powerful
-lever that in the long run expands output and brings down prices
is in any case made of other stuff.2"
The supporters of the "performance" approach to antitrust gener-
ally share this view that progressiveness is not only of vastly greater
social value than competitive efficiency, but that, as mentioned above, it
is quite as likely to spring from a monopolized as from a competitively
structured industry. They conclude, therefore, that if it is a progressive,
growing economy that is desired, it should be sought directly, not
through a policy that promises such uncertain results as one designed
to encourage the development of competitive industry "structures."
Seeing no causal connection, or at best only a very weak one, between
"structure" and "performance" (particularly progressiveness, or inven-
tion and innovation), they would focus the inquiry in antitrust cases
not on the "remote" question of the industry's structure, but directly on
19. See, e.g., DENISON, THE SOURCES Op ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED
STATES 266 (1962).
20. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84-85 (3d ed. 1942).
[VOL. 12 : p. 764
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the ultimate issue of whether its performance had been "workable" or
"effective." If so, the case would be dismissed. If not - if the industry
had, for example, been found guilty of suppressing new technology -
those supporting the "performance" approach would presumably then
turn to the question of devising a remedy -to remove that deficiency.
That remedy would be directed, however, solely to improving the indus-
try's progressiveness, not to increasing its "competitiveness." The em-
phasis here, then, is on the ultimate results of economic activity,
with no presumption that desired results can be secured, and unde-
sired results avoided, by choosing one type of market structure
and preventing another. Cases in which performance criteria are said
to have significantly influenced the outcome, resulting either in an
exoneration of the defendants or in at least saving them from divesture,
include United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,2 United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp.,2 2 United States v. Columbia Steel Co .,23
United States v. National Lead Co.,2 4 and United States v. E. I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co.
25
III. THE PERFORMANCE APPROACH
Several objections can be made to the "performance" approach
to antitrust summarized above. The first is that such research as has
been conducted on the point fails to support the argument "that we
need tolerate giant firms in order to achieve efficiency in research and
development. The economic evidence on the subject indicates that small
firms may be less efficient in this field, but that medium-sized firms are
as good as, if not better than, giant ones."' 6 Thus, beyond a certain
21. 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
22. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
23. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
24. 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
25. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). See STOCKING,
WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 374 (1961), for an analysis of the
performance criteria.
26. Letter from Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to Senator Wayne Morse, May 2, 1967, in
113 CONG. Rc. 7116 (daily ed. May 18, 1967). Dr. Turner summarized several of
these economic studies:
Professor Mansfield reports that the largest firms in the petroleum, drugs,
and glass industries spent somewhat less on research and development relatively
speaking than did smaller firms. And, Professor Mansfield concludes that "in
most industries, the productivity of an R&D program of given scale seems to be
lower in the largest firms than in somewhat smaller firms." Professor Scherer
concludes from his study of patent behavior in a group of 448 firms selected
from the Fortune list of the largest 500 industrial corporations in 1955 that "the
evidence does not support the hypothesis that corporate bigness is especially
favorable to high inventive output. ... In view of this evidence, we stand by
the position that research and development economies do not typically require
giant size. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
See also, HAMBERG, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS op RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(1966) ; SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1966); Scherer, Firm
Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented Inventions, 55 AM.
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minimum size, one that appears to be essential before significant efforts
at research and development can be profitably undertaken at all, there
seems to be no further correlation between firm size and innovation.
And certainly no evidence has been presented to demonstrate that this
minimum firm size needed for effective innovation is so large that such
a firm would necessarily be a monopolist in its various markets.27
A second objection to any antitrust standard that would make the
outcome of cases turn on whether the industry had been "progressive"
is that there is apparently no acceptable method of distinguishing
"good" from "bad" performance in this respect. It is not enough
merely to count the number, and assess the significance, of the inven-
tions and innovations that have in fact appeared in the industry over
some particular period of time.
What will be lacking is any basis for deciding whether the firm's
performance was good or bad in light of its opportunities. The
record may reveal that output has grown ten times in the period
under study; it will not reveal whether or not output could have
grown fifteen times if price policy had been different or if more
vigorous efforts had been made in product development, in foreign
marketing, or in cost reduction.
28
EcoN. Rzv. 1098, 1114 (1965) ; Comanor, Research & Technical Change in the Phar-
mnaceutical Industry, 47 REv. op ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 182, 190 (1965) ; Mans-
field, Industrial Research and Development Expenditures: Determinants, Prospects.
and Relation to Size of Firm and Incentive Output, 72 J. or, POLITICAL ECONOMICS
334 (1964).
27. One study suggests that a manufacturing firm with sales of about $18 million,
employing perhaps 1,000 persons, would be sufficiently large to maintain a research
staff of efficient size, that is, at least twenty scientists and their technical assistants.
Hearings Before Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
. - (1967), (Statement by David Hamberg, Size of Enterprise and Technical
Change). The firm at the bottom of Fortune's list of 500 largest industrial firms in
1965 had sales of $109.6 million; the one at the top had sales of $20.7 billion. Fortune,
July 15, 1966, pp. 232-47. See generally Cooper, R&D Is More Efficient in Small
Companies, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1964, p. 76.
28. KAYSN & TURNR 53-54. (Emphasis added.) It is particularly inappro-
priate to "compare" the progressiveness of different industries, and then conclude:
[Tihat industries with frequent and important technological innovations have
a "good" performance in the matter of progressiveness, whereas those with in-
frequent and unimportant innovations have a "bad" performance, or are "tech-
nologically backward." Application of this criteria of "gross progress," for
example, would find the petroleum refining industry as showing "good" progress
in the last forty years, with a steady stream of technological developments, but
the flour-milling industry as having "poor" progress, since over the same period
firms in that industry were able to find or introduce only minor improvements
in a technique which was fully developed by the early years of the century (when
the petroleum industry was in its infancy). The comparison is unfair, and the
conclusions are meaningless, both because of the wide difference in the intrinsic
complexity of the manufacturing process involved, and of the wide difference
in the ages of the two industries. The rate of "gross progress" is not a good
direct index to how effectively an industry has performed in the dimension of
progressiveness. The more appropriate question (and standard of evaluation)
concerns how progressive the industry was relative to its opportunities - how
well it exploited the available opportunities for invention and innovation. Each
industry should be judged in terms of how well it did relative to what it was
"possible" to do.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 395 (1959). (Emphasis in original.)
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This latter standard, however, is by its very nature wholly unwork-
able, for:
[T]here is no way of knowing, a priori, what unknown things
can reasonably be expected to be discovered. The "potential" rate
of discovery, against which the actual rate might be measured,
cannot in any way be systematically guessed or approximated....
Therefore, the absolute rate of discovery is not susceptible to mean-
ingful evaluation, and its relative acceptability from a social stand-
point is not subject to meaningful measurement. 2
Or as another group of observers sums up the problem:
It seems impossible to establish scientifically any final conclusion
concerning the relation between monopoly and innovation. The
arguments in favor of monopoly are not very good arguments, and
they do not wholly fit the facts. On the other hand, the case for
competition is certainly not conclusive. In the last resort, those
who have to frame public policy must judge whether competition,
with its stimulus and uncertainty, will be a more effective force
than monopoly, with its security 'but its absence of the driving
force of rivalry."°
At least one modest conclusion would seem to be justified here,
however. Considering the unquestioned benefits of competition on other
grounds, the inconclusiveness of the evidence on progressiveness would
hardly seem to call for an abandonment of the national policy in favor
of competition and against monopoly. The burden of proof, and the
onus of failing to carry it, would seem to be properly on those who
argue -that the benefits of monopoly in this particular dimension more
than outweigh its rather obvious shortcomings in other respects. Until
29. Id. at 396. Bain concludes that both fact and theory are equally barren ol
the relation, if any, between structure and progressiveness:
As we are unable to distinguish good from bad performance in the dimension
of technological progress shown by available records of this progress, we are
similarly unable to establish, empirically, the conditions of market structure
which might favor good progress. An alternative is to theorize, to the end of
developing a priori predictions of what structural conditions should be expected
to lead to optimal progressiveness. Unfortunately, the indications of such
theorizing are so inconclusive as to be almost useless. We therefore drop the
matter of technological progressiveness, and turn to other matters.
Id. at 397.
30. JUKES, SAVERS, & STILLERMAN, TiiE SOURCES OF INVENTION 249 (1961).
Others have also challenged the argument that without monopoly power, that is,
freedom to reap the full benefits of the new development without interference from
competitors, there cannot be an effective incentive for innovation:
[C]ompetition is clearly a stimulus to innovation. It is precisely when old
products made by old processes yield only meager returns that the economic
stimulus to discover new products or cheaper processes is strongest. Thus
reduction of market power may not impair the capacity for innovation, and it
will certainly increase the incentive to it.
KAYSEN & TURNER 85.
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that burden has been carried, there would appear to be little basis for
shifting to a policy that would accept a "good" performance in the
matter of invention and innovation as justification for the monopoliza-
tion of an industry.
Perhaps the ultimate difficulty with the "performance" standard,
however, is that it has no workable remedy to offer when it finds "un-
workable" competition. Having denied the existence of a causal relation
between structure and performance, it cannot logically prescribe dives-
titure. And if it prescribes an injunctive remedy, it is then faced with
the problem of framing a command that will effectively say to the
firms in an industry, "Be efficient," or "Be progressive." Are they
behaving like oligopolists - restricting output and holding prices
above a competitive level? That is their very nature, and commanding
them to do otherwise is roughly comparable to the "command" method
of flood control, namely, standing on a river's banks and verbally
exhorting its waters to stand still. To be sure, injunctive remedies can
eliminate particular practices that may have been handicapping smaller
firms and excluding potential entrants, thereby preserving the high
concentration and entry barriers that make such pricing possible. This
is, in effect, a "structural" approach, however. An attempt to alter
the pricing and output patterns themselves by injunctive command is
another matter entirely, and one that is wholly at odds with the basic
philosophy of antitrust.
If one denies that performance can be improved by structural
changes - directly, by reducing concentration thru divestiture, or indi-
rectly, by lowering entry barriers or restraining conduct that has been
used to protect an anti-competitive structure from gradual erosion
by smaller firms and new entrants - then there are only two alterna-
tives left: (1) government regulation in the fullest sense of the word,
including direct specification of what is to be produced, how much is
to be produced, the techniques that are to be used in producing it, and
the price that is to be charged for it, or (2) outright government own-
ership of the industry's production facilities." That is to say, the
government must ultimately be driven either to specify the "per-
formance" desired in minute detail, e.g., a maximum profit rate of,
say, eight per cent on invested capital (profit rates or markups being an
aspect of "efficiency," as mentioned above), or to undertake the entire
task on its own.
31. See Address by Willard F. Mueller, Director, Bureau of Economics, FTC,
The Philosophy of Antitrust, North Central Regional Extension Marketing Work-
shop, November 1, 1966, Camp Kett, Michigan, p. 1. (On file at the offices of the
Villanova Law Review.)
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Both of these latter alternatives are highly undesirable for a num-
ber of reasons, one of the more obvious of which is again simply the
matter of efficiency. To specify "performance" is, in effect, to "manage"
business enterprises 'by setting prices, output, wages, and so forth, a
task for which government officials have never been thought particu-
larly qualified. The enormity of the regulatory task can best be ap-
preciated by comparing it to the quite modest effort involved in an anti-
trust program:
The important point to grasp is that [a structural] antitrust
policy does not involve exhaustive investigation or analysis of all
the factors which conceivably may have a bearing on industrial
performance.... Its strength derives from the fact that a maximum
effect may flow from a minimum of government intervention. It is
not necessary to assemble and maintain a vast bureaucracy which
exercises continued intervention in and surveillance of the affairs
of business. But this is precisely what is required when public policy
has as its objective the identification and implementation of what
constitutes desirable performance. To do this job well requires an
enormous volume of regulatory resources.
32
As an illustration of this principle at work, it is said that:
[T]he Interstate Commerce Commission, whose major responsi-
bilities involve setting of rates and other performance characteris-
tics, has twice as many employees as the combined employees in
antitrust enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice. And importantly, the ICC has responsi-
bility for just a part of the field of transportation. Quite-clearly,
direct specification of industry performance requires, relative to
the antitrust approach, a vast amount of government resources and
intervention into the day-to-day affairs of business.3
The ultimate objective of all public regulation is simply to create
artificially the end results that competition is expected to produce
naturally. Under perfect competition, as noted above, firms that are
unable to produce at the lowest possible per unit cost are forced out of
business, thus leaving all production in the hands of firms of optimum
productive efficiency; firms that incur unnecessary selling costs meet
the same fate, with the result that distribution also takes place in
the most efficient manner; and, finally, the pressure of new entrants
squeezes out all excess or monopoly profits, leaving on top of those two
"layers" of minimized costs (production costs and distribution costs)
a profit margin that gives the entrepreneur a "normal" or competitive
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 5.
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return on his investment, but no more. The final result, then, is that
the consuming public gets the product at the least possible total cost,
given the existing state of technology - minimum production cost,
minimum selling cost, and minimum profit margin.84 But only one of
these, the profit margin, is under the direct control of the "regu-
lator." He can prescribe the socially acceptable profit rate, one that
approximates the return being earned in competitive industries (e.g.,
eight per cent after taxes on invested capital) and set a price that, after
deducting an assumed level of costs, will yield approximately that
return. But the regulator is relatively powerless to do anything about
the costs themselves, and these are by far the largest component of the
total "price" paid by the public. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued
that "cost is a function of price," not the other way around - that,
in accordance with some "Parkinson's Law" of its own, cost tends to
creep upward to fill any available "space" left vacant as price soars
higher and higher above the minimum cost line.85
Quite aside from the matter of efficiency, however, such a per-
vasive system of regulation, if extended throughout the economy,
would undoubtedly be found socially and politically offensive to the
bulk of the American people. Regulation, by putting a ceiling on prices
and profits, and by setting a limit on how many firms may be allowed
to enter, necessarily puts at the same time a "ceiling" on opportunity
itself, on what Americans sometimes call the "main chance." That
would indeed be a closing of the "last frontier," the ringing down of
a curtain on what we still fondly refer to as the "American dream" -
an action not likely to be widely applauded in a country that still
cherishes the Horatio Alger "luck and pluck" saga as a part of its
received faith.
It seems fair to conclude, in short, that the "performance" ap-
proach to the monopoly problem is not a particularly promising one.
To be sure, performance data can be highly revealing in particular cases,
as in those instances where long-run profits greatly in excess of com-
petitive levels have been viewed as revealing a market structure
(monopoly) otherwise obscured by the difficulty of marking off the
"relevant market" itself.36 But its usefulness as a supplement to market
34. KAYSEN & TURNER 62-65.
35. This is of course one of the reasons why profit margins are an incomplete
measure of monopoly power: a monopoly that could have earned, say, thirty-five per
cent after taxes on its investment, may have squandered the bulk of it on unnecessary
costs (costs that would have been squeezed out under the pressure of a competitive
market structure), leaving the appearance of only a "normal" - or "competitive" -
return (say eight per cent) to confuse students of monopoly.
36. See, e.g., Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Coin-
petition, 45 Am. ECON. Rev. 29 (1955), in A.E.A. READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 118 (Heflebower & Stocking ed. 1958).
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structure data should not be taken as evidence that it can either
substitute for, or override evidence of, those far more basic features -
concentration and entry barriers - in determining the long-run pros-
pects for effective competition in an industry. A policy standard that
would have the antitrust authorities and the courts assign greater
weight to a defendant's "efficiency" and "progressiveness" than to an
inordinately large share of a highly concentrated, entry-barricaded
market is in reality no "standard" at all; it is simply a vote of "no
confidence" in a competitive economic system.
IV. THE CONDUCT APPROACH
The antitrust laws of the United States have, for the most part,
been addressed either exclusively or primarily to matters of business
behavior - to "acts," not "situations." Antitrust is a branch of law,
and law is traditionally concerned primarily with concepts of fairness
or justice to the individual litigants before it, not with the implemen-
tation of broad abstractions. Thus, -the first of the federal antitrust
laws, the Sherman Act of 1890, did not outlaw "monopoly," as such,
but (1) collusive activities that "restrain trade," and (2) activities
that tend to "monopolize" trade.3 7 Much emphasis has been placed on
the fact that the statute employed the verb, "monopolize," rather than
the noun form, "monopoly." Hence it is not enough for the prosecutor
to prove the mere existence of a monopoly; he must also show that its
existence is attributable to someone's act of "monopolizing," that is,
to the acquisition of monopoly power by means that are in some way
offensive to the law's notions of commercial fairness and justice.
37. Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ... 26 Stat. 209 (1890),
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.... ".26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1964).
The other major "antitrust" statutes are the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964), as amended; the Federal Trade Commission Act,
38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964), the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimina-
tion Act, 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), and the Celler-Kefauver Anti-
Merger Act, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). The Clayton Act of 1914, as
amended, deals with four business practices: price discrimination (section 2);
exclusive dealing and tying arrangements (section 3) ; mergers (section 7) ; and
interlocking directorates (section 8).
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, as amended, contains only one
substantive section, section 5: "Unfair methods of competition in [interstate] com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful." 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
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This conception of the problem has necessarily directed the focus
of the inquiry away from the rather impersonal economic forces of the
market, and focused them, instead, upon the treatment accorded to
competitors of the alleged monopolist. The central issue is thus shifted
away from the basically economic question of whether market power is
being used to injure the consuming public, to the more clearly legal
question of whether that power has been acquired in a manner that
somehow "unfairly" disadvantaged competing firms. In other words,
the law has directed its concern to the opportunities of businessmen
to compete for the profits of a market, rather than to any "right" of
the consumer to buy in a competitive market, at competitive prices. To
be sure, it has generally been assumed that the "protection of competi-
tors" is simply a proxy for the "protection of competition," and hence
that the prevention of conduct unfairly reducing the sales and profits
of individual competitors is not only consistent with, ,but quite suf-
ficient to assure, the preservation of a competitive market and its
accompanying public benefits. But the mere formulation of the problem
in terms of "fair conduct" has tended to place a premium on "ethical"
arguments -in antitrust cases, rather than on economic analysis. The
question has seldom been, "Has he acquired the power to charge the
public super-competitive prices ?" but rather "Did he acquire whatever
power he has 'fairly'?" While the public has a decided interest in
seeing that commercial competition is conducted fairly - that those
who risk their time and capital are not injured by techniques that have
nothing to do with economic efficiency - the public interest here is
largely the same as that involved in the administration of justice
generally, namely, the concept that one can assure justice for himself
only by assuring it to every other man. The first question, however,
involves a more direct form of public interest, since a noncompetitive
market translates directly into prices that are higher than ,those that
would have prevailed had competition been more effective, and hence
means, quite unambiguously, a lower standard of living for those
members of the public paying that super-competitive price.
As noted above, it has generally been taken for granted that the
same result is reached by both approaches - that competition will be
amply protected as a by-product of protecting competitors from "un-
fair" business practices. The premise here, and it may very well be a
correct one, is that entrepreneurial -talent is not the exclusive province
of a handful of men running a few very large firms but a commodity
in sufficient supply among American businessmen that there can prob-
ably be no such thing as a monopoly acquired by entirely "fair" means.
This argument is, one might say, another expression of the essentially
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egalitarian American spirit, a firm denial of another form of "elitism.""8
If one man can do it, there will be others who can and will learn to
do it just as well, if not better. One does not remain a "champion" for-
ever. The title can be held for a while; but champions grow old and
complacent, and younger, stronger men remorselessly narrow the gap.
When that does not happen in commerce, when one firm gets and
holds an effective monopoly on some market for a substantial period
of time, many are not persuaded that the means used to 'beat off the
challengers can have been wholly "fair." Carried to its logical extreme
this argument apparently implies that an effective antitrust policy can
be built entirely on rules of law prohibiting "unfair" business conduct.
There seems to be no question but that the elimination of unfair
practices does in fact generally improve the competitiveness of markets.
One of the major difficulties of an antitrust policy based solely on con-
duet standards, however, is that it is fairly difficult to administer.
Judges and administrators, like men generally, often differ rather widely
in their conceptions of what is "fair" and what is "unfair" in business
dealings. Thus a particular court's willingness to tolerate a very sub-
stantial amount of "unnecessary roughness" might well result in the
elimination of all but the two or three largest firms in one market (and
hence eliminate most price competition there), while an unduly sensi-
tive commercial conscience might lead another court to suppress, in
another market, even the kind of socially-beneficial forms of rivalry
(e.g., nondiscriminatory price cutting) that generally do no more than
weed out the inefficient and hence lead to a more productive use of the
country's economic resources. A fairly persuasive case can thus 'be
made for 'the proposition that, if "competitiveness" (and its high out-
put and low prices) is desired for its own sake or for the economic
38. We must assume that it is not the case that a few firms, managed by men
of superior gifts, can and will continue to attract the small number of superior
managers, and thus will be enabled to outperform all rivals in all fields, were
they permitted and motivated to do so. In other words, large permanent differ-
ences in economic efficiency among firms, persisting in time over wide ranges of
output and wide product lines, are either nonexistent or rare. This proposition
implies something about the distribution of business ability in the population at
large and the nature of business activity. On the first point it is assumed that
first-grade managerial talent exists sufficient to man a few hundred companies
such as Du Pont, General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, etc.: there is a
chairman of the board's gavel in the attache case of every division tnanager.
On the second, it is assumed that where a particular firm does have an advantage
in men and methods, rivals can and will copy the methods and hire away the
men, and that incentives of pay and promotion will suffice to do so. . . . It is
hard to support this proposition with concrete evidence, and, while we believe it
accords with experience, others have expressed different views. Perhaps it is
best to label this assumption as an article of democratic faith and leave it at that.
KAYSEN & TURNER 9. (Emphasis added.)
Schumpeter is mentioned as one of those that had doubts about the wide
distribution of executive talent. "Whether he had any more evidence than a temper-
mental inclination toward aristocracy is not clear." Id. at 9 n.8.
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results it causes, -the law should consider it directly rather -than through
a proxy, adding it as a further objective of antitrust policy, alongside
"fairness" and any others that might be considered desirable.
Another and perhaps even more serious difficulty with a "fair-
ness" standard is that, in practice, it is likely to mean equal treatment
only for firms already operating in the market, with little attention to
the "rights," if any, of potential entrants.8 9 This, in turn, is related
to such problems as those raised by mergers or "peaceful combina-
tion."' 4' A merger of consenting firms, one that presumably benefits
both of the parties, might be quite devoid of any trace of "unfairness"
to the remaining firms in the market and yet, by raising barriers to
entry, severely injure both the opportunities of potential entrants and
the interests of the consuming public in the larger output and lower
prices that the added capacity of new competition could reasonably be
expected to bring.
Finally, -the most fundamental shortcoming of a "conduct" ap-
proach to antitrust is that, as mentioned above, it focuses on the symp-
toms, and not on the underlying disease. "Unfair" conduct generally
consists of coercing some rival, supplier, or customer in a way that
enriches the defendant at the other party's expense. But coercion,
by its very nature, implies the existence of some degree of monopoly
power, a "reservoir of force on which it draws that accounts for the
acquiescence of the coerced party in a situation that, by definition, is
not the result of mutually free bargaining."'" That is to say, the various
aspects of business conduct commonly dealt with under the antitrust
laws - price discrimination, exclusive dealing, and the like - are
largely symptomatic of a more deep-seated ailment, an anticompetitive
market structure on either the selling side, the buying side, or both.42
None of this is intended to suggest that the law should be uncon-
cerned with unfair business conduct. On the contrary, -there are several
reasons why conduct can never be left completely unrestrained. For one
thing, even -the proponents of the "structural" approach agree that the
line of causation does not run exclusively from structure-to-conduct-
to-performance, but often in the other direction, from conduct back to
39. KAYS8N & TuRNtt 16.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 17.
42. [Thus], coercion consists in the ability of a firm with market power
to impose terms in a bargain which the other party would refuse, were there
an alternative transactor with whom he could deal more advantageously. The
normal instruments of business bargaining, delays, refusals to deal, representa-
tions which fall short of complete candor, and the like, can be turned uniformly
to the advantage of the powerful bargainer, because his partner in the transaction
would be even worse off if he did not accept the terms imposed.Ibid.
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structure. For instance, several kinds of business behavior, such as
mergers and predatory or exclusionary practices, can severely alter
the structure of an industry, quickly transforming a competitive struc-
ture into an oligopolistic or monopolistic one.43 Secondly, so long as
any substantial aggregations of monopoly power are allowed to remain
in existence - and there have been few serious proposals to launch a
widespread attack on every industry that shows any signs of market
imperfection - some restraint must necessarily be placed on the way
that residual power is used. The law's traditional role of preventing
as much unfairness or injustice as possible will always remain as one
of the major objectives of antitrust policy.
V. THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH
An evaluation of the "structural" approach requires a somewhat
fuller description of its basic concepts than the brief summary sketched
previously. As noted, the structural features of a market are described
under the two general terms, "concentration" and "barriers to entry."
These refer to the number and size distribution of the firms in the
market (concentration) and to any obstacles that impose on firms
attempting to enter for the first time, vis-A-vis the already established
firms, either higher per-unit costs or lower per-unit prices (barriers
to entry)." The competitive significance of the first lies in the fact
that high concentration - a small number of firms, each with relatively
large shares of the total market - is said to destroy the incentive for
independent decisions on price and output, and to encourage, instead,
the development of what is called "oligopolistic interdependence" - a
recognition of the fact that the profits of each is dependent on the
decisions of the others. The competitive significance of the second
structural feature, entry barriers, lies in the fact that the power to
charge super-competitive prices conferred by the market's high concen-
tration can be exercised only if there are barriers to hold back the new-
comers that can be expected to pour in as the price, and hence the
profits, rises to increasingly attractive levels. From the standpoint of
43. This recognition of a reverse flow - that certain forms of conduct are sharp
enough to cut into the underlying market structure - should not be confused with
the general "conduct approach" discussed here. The distinction is that, whereas the
latter is concerned with conduct as such (because of its unfairness and the like), the
interest of the structuralist is primarily in its anticipated effects on concentration and
entry barriers, not the conduct itself. This distinction is particularly critical in those
instances where the conduct in question, though "unfair" and hence presumably
unlawful, is inherently incapable of altering the industry's structural composition.
Similarly, there are a number of practices that, while highly effective as entry barriers
and thus as destroyers of effective competition, are regarded as quite "fair" by the
courts and thus remain entirely lawful. See, e.g., the discussion of exclusive distributor-
ship agreements, note 67 infra and accompanying text.
44. See note 7 supra.
SUMMER 1967]
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss4/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the would-be monopolist, then, neither is sufficient without the other.
"What concentration gives, easy entry can take away."45 From the
public's viewpoint, this means, happily, that there is a "second line of
defense" against the harmful effects of such collective monopolization -
that even though -the battle to prevent undue concentration may have
been lost, the actual fruits of victory, low prices and high output, can
still be squeezed from the industry if -the entry barriers around it can
be kept sufficiently low.
This is not to say, however, that concentration is less important
than the condition of entry. Indeed, it is only after a market has
become, or is about to become, highly concentrated that there is even
any occasion for asking whether entry is easy or not. In the atomistic
market - one with many firms, none of which has any significant
share of the total market - the internal ("intraindustry") competition
generated among themselves by that large number of already-
established firms should itself be sufficiently intense to force price and
output to competitive levels, with no assistance needed from those
additional firms that might 'be standing outside the market's perimeter,
threatening to enter if prices and profits should start to climb to par-
ticularly attractive levels. Thus, it is only in a single situation, one in
which the intensity of competition inside a market is becoming too
weak to keep price and output at competitive levels, that the pressures
exerted by potential competition from the outside will be noticed by,
and can be expected to restrain the conduct of, that market's already-
established firms. In other words, the two structural features that most
significantly influence the competitive behavior of business enterprises,
"concentration" and "entry barriers," are so closely interrelated that
it is very difficult to understand either without some grasp of the other
as well.
A. Oligopolistic Interdependence and the Concentration Factor
High degrees of concentration are relevant because, as noted, they
imply high degrees of "oligopolistic interdependence" between the
larger firms in the market, a recognition of their mutual interests and
the benefits of avoiding conduct that reduces both their individual and
collective profits. Unlike the small firms in an "atomistic" market -
firms with shares so small that any one of them could either double
its output or go out of business entirely without causing a noticeable
change in the over-all market price of the commodity in question -
45. Dixon, Antitrust Policy: Some "Legal" and "Economic" Considerations, 14
U.C.L.A.L. Riv. 979, 989 (1967).
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neither of the "big four" in an industry will be able to avoid the
discovery, sooner or later, that its individual output volume is such
a large percentage of total market sales that any significant increase
or decrease in its individual volume will have an immediate effect
on the entire market price. Thus, if each of the "big four" firms cur-
rently have twenty per cent of a given market, and if one of them
suddenly decides to 'build another plant and double its individual out-
put, the "excess" supply created by this new capacity can be expected
to cause a sharp drop in the marketwide price, including not just the
price received by the firm that built the new plant, but by the others
as well.4" At that lower price, 'however, the firm that built the new
plant might discover that, while its sales had indeed doubled, its total
profits had not increased at all or had perhaps even declined. Experi-
ences of this sort quickly teach firms that they are no longer "inde-
pendent" of each other, but -that, on the contrary, the earnings of each
are closely dependent on 'the price and output policies of the others.
4 7
The essential nature of oligopoly is most clearly seen, however, in
the matter of price-setting.4" The critical distinction between oligopoly,
on the one hand, and competition, on the other, is that whereas the
individual firm in the competitive industry can alter its price without
causing a reaction by its rivals, ,the individual oligopolist must anticipate
precisely the opposite result, namely, that any price change it makes
will be noticed by its rivals and taken into account by them in setting
46. This is what is called the "percentage effect." Heflebower, Corporate
Mergers: Policy and Economic Analysis, 77 Q.J. EcoN. 537, 554 (1963). Under the
"law of demand," the price of a product must generally be lowered if more of it is to
be sold. (Consumers have only so much money to spend. Moreover, the "satisfac-
tion" the consumer gets from owning a second unit of any commodity is generally
less than that gotten from owning the first; e.g., most people do not get twice as much
enjoyment from owning two Cadillacs as they get from owning one Cadillac.
"Diminishing returns" sets in with the purchase of the second unit.) Here, for
example, the new plant, by adding twenty per cent to the total volume offered for
sale in the market would create a "surplus" and hence force all of the sellers to
lower their prices in order to induce consumers to clear the market. Whether a
twenty per cent increase in the volume offered for sale would result in a corresponding
twenty per cent decrease in the price would depend on exactly how sensitive con-
sumers of this particular commodity are to price reductions. The fall in price
following an increase in output can be on a one to one basis (a twenty per cent
increase in volume causes a twenty per cent fall in price) or it can be either more
or less than that.
47. Dixon, supra note 45, at 987.
48. There is of course a relationship between the price selected by an industry
and the quantity that can be sold (the "law of demand"), so that the fixing of the
one automatically determines the other. As Bain illustrates this principle:
For example, the demand for product A in a given situation may be such that
buyers will take 10,000 units per month if the price is $1.00 per unit, 11,000 per
month if the price of 95 cent per units is charged, and 12,500 units per month
if the price is 90 cents per unit. Now if sellers set a price of 95 cents per unit,
they have effectively determined their saleable output . . . at 11,000 units per
month. If, conversely, they do not set a price at all but simply produce and
offer 11,000 units of output for sale for what it will bring, buyer demands will
tend to bring the selling price to 95 cents.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 269 n.1 (1959).
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their own price. If it cuts its price, for example, and if its rivals
promptly follow with similar cuts of their own, then the firm initiating
,the move will presumably gain nothing by it: the quick matching of its
new price will remove the incentive for buyers to transfer their
patronage and hence will presumably prevent it from making any gain
in market share at the expense of its "competitors." In addition, it
is now selling that unchanged market share at a lower price - and
thus may well be realizing a lower net profit than it was realizing
before the price cut was undertaken.49 The net result may be, in other
words, that it now has the same percentage "slice" of the total "pie"
as before, but that the size of the pie itself has shrunk.
If, on the other hand, the individual oligopolist elects to raise its
price, it must similarly anticipate a reaction by its rivals. If they follow
with matching increases of their own, then again market shares will
be unchanged. (Now, however, prices are higher, not lower, and
both individual firm and industry profits are presumably up; each
has an unchanged percentage "slice," but of a larger "pie.") And
if the others do not follow the price increase by the first firm, then its
customers will presumably start to desert, and it will be forced to
rescind it and rejoin them at the lower price.
The critical point here is the knowledge, by each member of the
oligopoly, that a price change by him is, in effect, a price change by
the industry as a whole. Price differentials, if large enough to be
effective in actually diverting trade from one oligopolist to another,
cannot and will not be tolerated for long. Each knows this in advance.
He knows the others cannot afford to let him maintain a lower price
and divert their trade to him. If they are to behave rationally, that
is, as profit-maximizers, then they must meet his price cut. Similarly,
they know he must come back down if they fail to follow his price
changes upward. Knowing that there can be no permanent differentials
in their prices, they necessarily know that any permanent change by
one must be a permanent change by all. When the individual oligopolist
is thinking about changing his price, therefore, he must recognize
that his fellow oligopolists are going to take some action that will
erase the new price differential and hence that his market share is
going to remain unchanged. The only occasion for a price change,
then, is when one or more of the firms believes that the size of the
"pie" itself can be changed in such a way as to increase not just
49. This depends on how responsive consumers are to price changes in this par-
ticular industry. It is possible, of course, for an industry price cut to cause so large
an increase in industry volume that profits are enlarged, not reduced. This would
imply, however, that the industry had previously been short-sightedly maintaining
prices that were too high to maximize its profits.
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his individual profits, as such, but his profits as a part of increased
group profits. With each member knowing that he will not be allowed
to price differently than the others, and that he can only increase his
individual profits 'by increasing those of 'the group as a whole, the
oligopolist is expected to rationally avoid price cuts that demonstrably
lessen the group's (and his own) profits, and to either initiate himself,
or at least recognize and go along with, any price increases that will
in fact (taking into account the effects on volume) add to both group
and firm profits. This "most profitable" price for an oligopoly and
each of its members is, then, other things being equal, the same as
the "monopoly" price, the price a profit-maximizing monopolist would
be expected to discover by trial and error and, eventually, adopt as his
long-run price policy. The industry is quite as much "monopolized"
by the one as by the other. One is a "collective" monopoly, achieved
by a group of firms acting in unison (though, perhaps, noncollusively),
the other a single-firm monopoly. The economic results are essentially
the same.
Needless to say, however, not all industries classified as
"oligopolies" succeed in achieving this kind of perfect coordination.
Actual observation shows that in many such industries prices are
nowhere near the monopoly price "ceiling" and may in fact be quite
close to -the competitive price "floor." What causes these differences
in results ? Several factors are believed to be at work here, particularly
(1) differences in the actual degree of concentration in one "oligopoly"
as compared with that in another, and (2) differences in the height
of the barriers guarding entry to one "oligopoly" as compared with
those around another.
It should not be assumed that there is some agreed-upon definition
of when an industry leaves the "competitive" classification and crosses
a border in-to some clearly defined category called "oligopoly." At
most there is a range, a sort of "zone" that separates the two. In
theory, of course, oligopoly begins at that point where "the few
largest sellers have a share of the market sufficient to make it likely
that they will recognize the interaction of their own" 5° and their
rivals' individual price and output decisions as causes of over-all
market price and profit levels. Since these matters of "recognition"
and "interaction" involve the responses of individual men, it is
not to be expected that a single set of "concentration" figures will
evoke precisely the same patterns of conduct in every industry, or
even in the same industry at different periods of time. In general,
however, it can be said that the majority of economists working in
50. KAYSEI & TURNER 27. (Emphasis added.)
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this area are substantially agreed that oligopolists are likely to "recog-
nize" their mutual interdependence a long time before they're able
to actually do anything about it. That is to say, there must be at least
two subclassifications of oligopoly. The first, "loose" oligopoly, refers
to that early stage in which the larger members of an industry or
market are beginning to recognize their community of interests but
are still too numerous, and their market shares too small, to permit
successful coordination (absent outright collusion) in restricting out-
put much below, and raising prices much above, competitive levels.
The reason, of course, is that at these relatively low levels of
concentration, the impact of individual firm actions on each of the
others, though perceptible, may be still too weak to cause the kind
of instant responses -that alone can suppress the individual urge to
shade prices and get extra volume at the expense of the others. The
various commentators have suggested that this lower or "recognition"
threshold of oligopoly may lie perhaps somewhere near the point where
the eight largest firms have thirty to forty-five per cent of the total
sales in a market,"' and the largest of these have individual shares of
perhaps five to eight per cent.5 2
It should not be assumed, however, that this kind of "loose" oligop-
oly has the same competitive implications as the more concentrated
variety, the "tight" oligopoly. This latter term is reserved for those in-
dustries in which concentration has proceeded to a point where the signs
of noncompetitve performance, such as output restriction and super-
competitive prices, have already appeared or are considered very likely
to appear in -time. Again different researchers have reached different
conclusions as to exactly how much concentration is required before
these undesirable results can reasonably be expected. But in general,
the various estimates range around two figures, namely, a market in
which the four largest firms control fifty per cent or more of the total
sales, and one in which the eight largest control seventy per cent or
more.
53
51. Ibid.; BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 123, 131-32 (1959).
52. BAIN, id. at 131. Thus, in the recent Von's Grocery case involving the merger
of two firms with four and seven-tenths per cent and four and two-tenths per cent
of the market, respectively, the Solicitor's brief quoted testimony by a former presi-
dent of the acquired firm that it and its competitors (the largest of which had eight
per cent of the market):
.. . check one another to see what the other man is doing, and we know that
we can't demand any more from the customer than the other fellow on a nationally
known item. There may be items in our store that we wouldn't be to the penny
the same price, whether it be a mistake in the pricing or a mistake that the store
would fail to catch when they made their price changes.
Brief for Appellant, p. 6 n.6, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
53. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 413 (1959); Bain, Relation of Profit
Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 1936-1940, 65 Q.J. EcoN.
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The explanation for the difference between the results expected
from "loose" and "tight" oligopolies lies in the different degrees of
"interdependence" generated by each. The smaller the number of firms,
and the larger the market share of each, the greater the impact of their
individual moves on each other and thus the sharper the awareness
of their mutual interdependence. This awareness is of course at its
absolute maximum where there are only two firms, each with equal
shares of the market. Suppose that, in this situation:
[O]ne of them, seller A, increases his sales volume 10 per cent
at the expense of the other, perhaps by a small price cut sufficient
to generate this increase. Then the other, seller B, will suffer
about a 10 per cent decrease in his sales volume. He will notice
it and identify its source, and he will presumably react by changing
his price. Moreover, his reaction will have a noticeable effect
on the sales volume of seller A. Then oligopolistic interdependence
(operating circularly or two ways between the two sellers) exists.54
If, on the other hand, the industry consists of five equal-sized sellers
rather than two, a similar ten per cent increase in the sales volume
of one would reduce the sales of each of the other four by only two
and one-half per cent. And if there are, instead, 101 equal-sized sellers
in the industry, such a ten per cent increase by one would reduce the
volume of each of the others by no more than about one-tenth of
one per cent.5"
Would there be "interdependence" in -the last two situations?
In one of them, the one involving the five-firm industry, the answer is
apparently "yes." The loss by the other four firms of two and one-half
per cent of the market "will still be noticeable and identifiable as to
source, and reactions would be induced. Oligopolistic interdependence
still exists, but it is not so strong an interdependence as would exist
if there were but two sellers."56 How about the other one, the situation
where there were 101 equal-sized firms? The answer there is said to
be "no."
It seems highly unlikely, in all actual markets in which slight
variations in sales volumes due to many causes are always
293 (1951). See also F.T.C., Relationship Between Market Structure and Profits,
TECHNICAL STUDY No. 8 - NATIONAL COMM'N ON FOOD MARKETING, THE STRUCTURE
or FOOD MANUFACTURING (1966).
[I]t appears that profits are particularly sensitive to concentration at levels where
four firms account for around 50 percent [of total sales] .... Four-firm concen-
tration in the immediate range of 50 percent appears to be a critical degree above
which profits are significantly higher and below which they are significantly lower.
Id. at 205.
54. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 121-22 (1959).
55. Id. at 122.
56. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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occurring, that this slight [1/10th of 1%o] loss of sales would
be either noticed or identified as to source by the other 100 sellers.
Reactions of rivals to individual-firm price and output adjust-
ments would not ensue or be anticipated; each seller would tend
to act independently without taking account of such reactions;
oligopolistic interdependence is not present; and an atomistic
market structure prevails instead. 7
It is this loosening of the ties that bind an industry's firms
together, the weakening of their incentive to price collectively and the
strengthening of their incentive to price independently, that, by degrees,
changes it from one that is effectively monopolistic to one that, although
still an oligopoly in the "recognition" sense mentioned previously, may
in reality be much closer to the "competitive" end of the structural
spectrum than the "monopoly" end.
Indeed, the significance of these attempts to distinguish these two
sub-categories of oligopoly lies primarily in the fact that while the first,
"loose" oligopoly, should certainly be considered an "early warning
signal" giving notice of approaching trouble, it can in fact be quite
workably or effectively competitive, yielding costs, prices, and outputs
that are not significantly different from those that could be expected
under perfect competition. This, in turn, means that the attainment
of these desirable fruits of competition is not, as some critics of anti-
trust have suggested, an impractical undertaking, one rendered too
costly by the existence of opportunities in various industries for very
large firms to realize significant economies of scale. The argument
has been that, because "perfect competition" as conceived in theory
requires perhaps hundreds of firms, each with infinitesimal market
shares, plus perfect knowledge of market conditions and the like,
and because any such fragmentation of American industry would
obviously reduce its efficiency, raise costs, and thus impair the people's
standard of living, all hopes for creating or maintaining competition
must perforce be abandoned and monopoly accepted with whatever
grace can be mustered. In the context of this "scale economy" argu-
ment, these findings that competition does not die off at the first sign
of oligopoly but, rather, retains the bulk of its vitality well into the
intermediate concentration ranges, is of course highly significant. It
means, in effect, that only a relatively modest change in the structure
of an industry, one that pushes it, for instance, barely across the line
from a "tight" to a "loose" oligopoly, can often be expected to yield
very large dividends for the public, restoring a degree of competition
that, while admittedly far from the economist's model of "perfect"
57. Ibid.
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competition, may nonetheless be quite effective in pressing prices and
output tolerably close to the competitive optimum. Restoring the
idealized version of "perfect" competition in America's mass-produc-
tion industries may well be both impossible and undesirable; preserving
a reasonably close, real-world approximation to that ideal, however,
may be well within our capabilities with no sacrifice at all in efficiency:
It is true that modern technology rules out highly fragmented
industries consisting of vast numbers of companies. But only the
unsophisticated will jump from this observation to the inference
that the alternative to atomistic competition is monopoly. Indus-
trial experience demonstrates that there is a vast difference between
the behavior of variously structured oligopolies. There is a broad
range of effectively competitive industries between fragmented
industries and those approaching monopoly. Careful study of
American industrial behavior reveals that most industries fall in
this intermediate territory .. 58
B. Barriers to Entry
Perhaps the most unique contribution of the "structural" approach,
however, lies in its emphasis on what is called the "condition of entry."
Economists have long recognized the role of newcomers in pushing
an industry's price down and its output up. Fulfillment of that tradi-
tional role hinged, however, on actual entry by outsiders, 9 and
classical economic theory credited those not already inside the market's
perimeter with little or no influence on its currently prevailing price and
output levels. In fact, however, potential entrants, those firms standing
at the edge of a market prepared to enter should it become sufficiently
attractive, can and frequently do have a very profound influence on
the behavior of that market's established firms. Just as there can be
a recognition of "interdependence" among the established firms them-
selves, so there can be an awareness of a similar interdependence be-
tween an industry's established firms, on the one hand, and its potential
entrants, on the other.
58. Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 80 (1967) (statement by Dr. Willard F. Mueller, Director Bureau of
Economics, FTC).
59. The building of new capacity, as noted above, achieves lower prices by
triggering the so-called "percentage effect." (See note 46 supra.) If the industry's
already established firms restrict their output and create the artificial "scarcity" that
permits them to charge a super-competitive price, new firms, attracted by those
abnormally high profits, will continue to enter and build new capacity until the
industry's profit rate is once more at the normal or competitive level. At that point,
there is no further incentive for newcomers to enter, and the process is automatically
stopped. Should "too much" entry occur and push profits below the competitive level,
some established firms would be expected to leave, this reverse flow continuing until
industry earnings had once more reached the competitive equilibrium point.
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There are few concepts as critical in understanding the Supreme
Court's current administration of our national antitrust policy as the
concept of business "entry" into a market or industry.6" It begins with
the premise that the birth and death of business enterprises, and their
entry into and exit from industries and markets, is motivated, at least
in large measure, by a rational pursuit of profit. This means that there
is a constant tendency for capital to flow out of those industries yielding
low returns and into those yielding higher ones. The net result of these
flows is a general tendency toward equalization of returns in the
various industries throughout the economy at some sort of "normal"
or competitive rate of profit. This latter concept, in turn, provides
economic analysis with the "basic tool needed to describe the conditions
under which entry and exit - those critical events in determining
whether an industry will or will not be competitively structured - can
be expected to take place."61  Thus, if the firms in an industry are
earning a return that is at least roughly comparable to that being
earned in most other sectors of the economy, there is no incentive
for them to leave their industry and go to another. Similarly, if the
return in a given industry is no better than elsewhere, there is no
incentive for any of the firms in other industries 'to leave their own
and come to that one. This leads to the definition of the normal or
competitive rate of return as one that is (1) sufficient, but just suf-
ficient, to induce the already established firms in an industry to continue
producing and selling the product, and (2) insufficient, but just barely
insufficient, to induce new firms to enter.62 This figure establishes
something of a pivot point: profits above that level are expected to
induce entry, profits below it are expected to encourage exits.
60. The term is formally defined by Bain as "the combination of two events: (1)
the establishment of an independent legal entity, new to the industry, as a producer
therein; and (2) the concurrent building or introduction by the new firm of (new)
physical production capacity. . . ." BAIN, BARRIERS To Ntw COMP-ITION 5 (1956).
The two requirements of "entry," then, are (1) a new firm, and (2) new productive
capacity. It should be noted, however, that the firm itself need not be "new" in the
newly-created sense; it can be an old, long-established firm in some other industry
or market, its "newness" lying solely in the fact that it is now entering this market
for the first time.
61. Dixon, supra note 45, at 988.
62. Alexander Hamilton explained the concept of the normal or "reasonable"
profit to the Second American Congress in 1791 this way: "When a domestic manu-
facture has attained to perfection, and has engaged in it the prosecution of a
competent number of persons, it invariably become cheaper. . . .The internal com-
petition which takes place, soon does away with everything like monopoly, [and]
by degrees reduces the price of the article to the minimum of a reasonable profit on
the capital employed. This accords with the reason of the thing, and with experience."
Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufacturers, 2d Cong., lst Sess. 133 (1791).
(Emphasis added.) See also KAYSEN & TURNER 63: "If normal profits are of the
magnitude of, say, 6 to 8 percent on invested capital [after taxes], an average profit
of 9 percent over ten years could not be identified as supernormal with any con-
fidence, but one of 12 percent could." Ibid.
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This figure also leads to the notion of an "entry-inducing price,"
a key element in understanding the concept of barriers to entry. The
first step is to translate the normal or competitive rate of return -
for example, eight per cent after taxes on invested capital - into
terms of "a 'gap' or margin between price, on the one hand, and cost,
on the other."6  As the leading firms in a tight-knit oligopoly acquire
a stronger and stronger sense of their mutual "interdependence" and
employ it to raise their prices higher and higher above costs, "a point
is . . .ultimately reached where the difference between the two trans-
lates [back] into a supernormal return [on invested capital] and
hence can be expected to attract new entrants. Outsiders are expected
to observe these price-cost movements ' 64 and, attracted by the prospect
of sharing in the supercompetitive profits, to move in "as soon as that
gap or spread between price and cost crosses the critical point where
more than a competitive profit is being earned."65 Unless entry is
restricted in some manner, therefore, monopoly pricing is self-
correcting: any attempt on the part of the leading firms in a highly
"concentrated" industry to raise their prices above the competitive
level will simply draw in an avalanche of new firms whose added output
will quickly push the price back down to where it was in the first place.
This means that there are situations in which a small number of leading
firms may have the power to raise prices to a noncompetitive level,
but where, because entry is unrestricted, they cannot afford to exercise
it. Or, to use again our shorthand summary of the relationship between
these two elements of market structure, what "concentration" gives,
"easy entry" can take away.
The established firms in concentrated industries are, of course,
aware of all this. They understand quite clearly that, unless they can
devise some means of barricading newcomers out, the industry's high
profits will act as a veritable magnet drawing those outsiders in.66 The
63. Dixon, supra note 45, at 989.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. The "interdependence" here between established sellers, on the one hand, and
potential entrants, on the other, is of course similar to, and in fact dependent on, that
which exists among the established firms themselves. It is only when each firm
regards its own individual price changes as equivalent to industrywide price changes
that it will take into account the possibility of inducing or forestalling entry.
Suppose that all sellers, or at any rate the principal sellers, in an industry act
collectively, in the sense that each views his own price changes as equivalent to
similar changes by the whole industry. Then each will regard the effect of his
own price changes on entry (whether he is leading others or following others
and thus validating their leadership) as similar to the effect of a concurrent
industry-wide price change on entry. And if this is so, two things follow. First,
the individual seller will always calculate, in considering his own price adjust-
ments, as if his own price adjustment had a definite (and in a sense maximum)
effect on entry, since his own adjustment is effectively equivalent to an industry-
wide price adjustment of a similar magnitude. He will be led to consider that
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objective, therefore, is to arrange it so that, no matter how wide the
"gap" between cost and price (profit margin) becomes for the estab-
lished firms themselves, it will always remain too narrow to permit
even the most efficient potential entrant to earn more than a normal
profit, and therefore, too narrow to induce him to enter. This is ac-
complished by erecting entry "barriers" around the industry, obstacles
that cut down the potential entrant's profit margin in one of two ways,
namely, (1) by imposing on him higher costs per unit than those en-
countered by the established firms themselves, or (2) by compelling
him -to sell his product at a lower price per unit than the established
firms get for a product of comparable quality."7 Either way, the result
his own price adjustment can alternatively forestall or induce entry to the
industry. Second, the seller will be led, in making his own price adjustments,
to consider the effect upon industry profits, via entry, of an industry-wide
price adjustment equivalent to his own, and upon his share of these profits.
BAIN, BARRIERS TO Nnw COMPETITIoN 27 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
67. As mentioned above (see note 7 supra), barriers are divided into three general
categories, (1) "absolute cost disadvantages," (2) "product differentiation disadvan-
tages," and (3) "scale economy disadvantages." An example of the first is dis-
criminatory pricing, or denying potential entrants the opportunity to buy supplies,
materials, and other input factors at as low a price as the larger established firms
can secure. Another and perhaps even more important example is the use of reciprocal
"exclusive distributorship" and "exclusive dealing" contracts in many consumer goods
industries, such as automobiles and the like. The gist of these contracts is that the
dealer agrees to handle only one manufacturer's "brand" and that manufacturer, in
turn (and in consideration therefor), agrees to sell his brand to no other dealer in
that local market. If another manufacturer tries to get the dealer to handle a second
brand, the dealer will refuse to buy; if another retailer opens up a local shop and
tries to buy from this manufacturer, the latter will refuse to sell. The net effect is
that (1) a very high barrier is thrown up at the producing level (new producers are
denied access to the most efficient retail outlets, thus increasing their distributive
costs and reducing the public acceptance, and hence the price, their products can
command), and (2) the high concentration thus fostered at the producing level is
then faithfully transmitted down to the retail level. Each retail market is structured
exactly like the upstream manufacturing market: the latter reproduces itself, amoeba-
like, in every town and hamlet across the nation. If there is only one manufacturer
of a product and it practices mutual exclusive dealing with its dealers, then by
definition there can be only one dealer in each retail market; if, on the other hand,
there are 20 such manufacturers and each appoints a single dealer in each town, there
will necessarily be 20 dealers there.
Using a "conduct" approach to these problems, however, the courts frequently
see them as nothing more than harmless "refusals to deal." See, e.g., Amplex of
Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., Trade Cas. 72,135 (4th Cir. 1967). In this
case, for example, the court saw nothing unlawful under either Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act or Section 3 of the Clayton Act in the defendant-manufacturer's
cancellation of an outboard-motor retailer's dealership because he had opened another
store in the same town and commenced selling a competing brand of outboard motor.
Structurally, the manufacture of outboard motors appears to be a classical "duopoly,"
with two firms holding some 85% or more of the national market. (The defendant,
Outboard Marine, maker of Johnson and Evinrude motors, has some 60%; its only
significant competitor, the maker of Mercury outboard motors, is said to have
25%-30%.) With this degree of concentration, no meaningful price competition is
to be expected at the manufacturing level; and since exclusive distributorship con-
tracts reproduce that same pattern downstream, they similarly wipe out any reason-
able expectation of such competition in the local retail markets. This result may be
"fair" as between these two manufacturers and their chosen dealers, but its fairness
to the Maryland public that would have benefited from the lower prices more
competitive market structures could reasonably have been expected to bring is far
from clear. Using a structural approach, instead, the courts might well be able to
focus upon a much sturdier application of the "rule of reason," one that would find
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is the same. Whether the potential entrant's disadvantage lies in his
higher costs or his inability to command as high a price for the same
quality product, the result is that he will always earn, regardless of
the price that happens to prevail in the market at any given time, a
lower profit than the established firms will be earning. If the current
price is one that just permits the established firms to break even, he
will be losing money; if the price is one that permits them to earn
only a normal or competitive return, he will be earning less than a
normal profit; and if the price is one that permits him to earn a com-
petitive profit, they will necessarily be earning more than that - a
supernormal or monopoly return.
This brings us to the actual measurement of the height of the
various entry barriers, expressed in terms of the degree or "extent to
which established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a
competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the industry."68
If entry is completely unobstructed, then, by definition, any price that
permits more than a competitive return - no matter how miniscule that
excess profit - will attract a sufficient number of entrants, with suf-
ficient new productive capacity, to beat the price back down to the
competitive level. But if there is some obstacle that imposes on the
most efficient potential entrant a cost or price disadvantage of, say, five
dollars per unit, and if this disadvantage permits the established firms
to safely raise their prices by that amount - from $100 to $105 for
instance - then it is said that there is a "five per cent entry barrier,"
one that permits the established firms to raise their prices five per cent
above the competitive level without inducing this potential entrant to
come into the market." It is conceivable, of course, that the barriers
surrounding an industry might be so high that the established firms
these arrangements reasonable or unreasonable depending on whether the structure
they transmitted was itself competitive or anticompetitive, the degree of "competitive-
ness" thus being the measure of "reasonableness," the true proxy of the public interest.
68. BAIN, BARRIERS To Ntw COMPETITION 3 (1956). The "competitive level of
prices" is defined here "as the minimum attainable average cost of production, distribu-
tion, and selling for the good in question," plus "a normal interest return on investment
for the enterprise." Id. at 6. After a detailed study of twenty industries, Bain rated
them as having either "very high," "substantial," or "moderate to low" entry barriers.
He concluded:
(1) that in the "very high" category, established firms might be able to elevate
price 10 per cent or more above [the competitive price level] while fore-
stalling entry;
(2) that with "substantial" barriers, the corresponding percentage might
range a bit above or below 7 per cent;
(3) that in the "moderate to low" category the same percentage will probably
not exceed 4, and will range down to around 1 per cent in the extreme
entries in this group. Id. at 170.
As to the type of factual information used in making these measurements, see the
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could raise their prices all the way to the monopoly "ceiling" without
inducing entry, that is, without creating a "gap" between cost and
price that would permit the handicapped newcomer to earn enough
above a competitive return to make entry attractive to him. In this
situation, it is said that entry is "blockaded" - it would only occur if
the price rose above the monopoly level, and such a price is auto-
matically ruled out by the assumption of rational, profit-maximizing
behavior.
Doubtless a more common situation than either completely "easy"
entry or completely "blockaded" entry is the intermediate case where
barriers are high enough to permit the established firms to charge a
price well above the competitive floor, but not high enough to permit
a price all the way up to the monopoly ceiling. Here the established
firms must make a critical decision. They must decide whether it
would be more profitable to keep their prices at that entry-excluding
level, contenting themselves with what might be a relatively modest
amount of excess profit at that price, or ignore the potential entrants
and raise prices all the way to the monopoly level, harvesting as much
excess profit as possible before the inevitable new entrants are able
to get into production and force the price back down to the competitive
level. Where entry barriers are relatively low, thus permitting very
little in the way of excess profits without attracting new entry, the
firms in a highly concentrated industry could very well find the latter
course the more profitable of the two.
In general, however, the other situation is probably much more
common in American industry. Here the established firms, recognizing
their "interdependence" not only with each other but with potential
entrants as well, and recognizing that the more profitable course is to
accept whatever excess profits their barriers permit them to take without
inducing new entry, will engage in what is called "entry-forestalling
pricing," that is, the selection of a price between the competitive floor
and the monopoly ceiling that falls just short of the figure that would
induce potential entrants to come in.
It would be hard to overestimate the significance of this latter con-
cept. It means that the price and output levels prevailing in an industry
are the products not simply of the sometimes feeble competitive forces
generated within the industry itself, but in addition, those compelled
by another, outside force, the force of potential competition "waiting in
the wings." The larger firms in the highly concentrated industries must
necessarily make some kind of an estimate as to how high they can raise
their prices without attracting new entrants or, stated another way,
they must estimate how low they have to keep their prices in order to
[VOL. 12 : p. 764
33
Mueller: The New Antitrust: A Structural Approach
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
THE NEW ANTITRUST
forestall entry. In short, they are required to actually make some kind
of "measurement," no matter how rough an approximation it might
really be and no matter whether they think of it in these or wholly dif-
ferent terms, of the actual height of the barriers around their industry.
To be sure, they may miscalculate and set a price above the entry-
forestalling level. The chances are, however, that any errors will be on
the low rather than the high side. Considering the penalty for crossing
the line and actually inducing new entry - "excess" capacity and lower
prices and profits - the more probable result is that the established
firms will pick a conservative figure well below the danger zone, thus
turning this element of uncertainty in estimating barrier heights to
the further advantage of the consuming public. The net result of
relatively moderate entry barriers, then, is that the established firms
in even the most concentrated sectors may be compelled to behave as
though they were members not of tight-knit, oligopolistic industries,
but of much more competitively structured ones. "This means, of
course, that potential entrants into those industries are exercising a keen
competitive influence - i.e., causing the price to be lower than it other-
wise would have been - even if they never actually enter.""° Chairman
Dixon goes on to say:
This concept of "barriers" and their role as a shield against
the competitive pressure of potential entrants provides economic
analysis with perhaps its most flexible and versatile tool in making
the kind of economic judgments required in antitrust cases. For
example, in the conglomerate merger field, the fact that the acquir-
ing and acquired firms occupy different markets automatically
means that the traditional tools of analysis - e.g., measuring
the changes in the number of firms and their respective market
shares - are wholly inadequate; one firm has simply replaced
another and hence there has been, by definition, no change in
either of those dimensions. It may still be possible, however, to
make reasonable estimate of the probable effect on competi-
tion by studying the effect the merger is likely to have on the
condition of entry. If, for example, . . . the acquiring firm
was . . . one of the group of "potential entrants" that the estab-
lished firms were pricing to "forestall"'" - holding prices lower
70. Dixon, supra note 45, at 990. (Emphasis added.)
71. Discovering the identity of an industry's "potential entrants" is very im-
portant and can be, in certain situations, extremely difficult. Its importance lies in
the fact that only those potential entrants that are recognized as such can exercise
a pre-entry influence on the insiders' behavior: the highest price that will forestall
entry cannot be known and its competitive influence felt until something is also
known (1) about the probable level of costs each potential entrant would be likely
to encounter if it actually entered and (2) about the returns each potential entrant
is earning in its other markets. Thus, a firm that perhaps appears at first blush to
SUMMER 1967]
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than they otherwise would have been in order to prevent its
entry - then the acquisition, by moving that firm from the out-
side to the inside without adding new capacity, has necessarily
removed its part of that restraint on prices and, to that extent,
has definitely lessened competition. And, if it can be shown that
this acquiring firm was likely to have actually entered on its own
by internal expansion - by building new capacity - then its
entry by merger has, by definition, reduced by one the number of
firms which would have ultimately been actually competing in the
industry. Finally, of course, it is frequently possible to show that
the "substitution" of the acquiring for the acquired firm has
itself changed the condition of entry ... that it has raised barriers
to entry (and perhaps disadvantaged other established firms as
well) and hence, pro tanta, reduced the intensity of future com-
petition in the industry."72
For example, a conglomerate merger that replaces a medium-sized
regional or local firm with a national organization known for its ag-
gressiveness against smaller firms can clearly have an adverse effect
on competition. The smaller firms already in the market, having
committed their capital, may be unable to leave readily and hence may
feel constrained to swallow their fears and try to stick it out (perhaps
taking care to avoid undue independence in their future pricing de-
cisions). Potential entrants of comparable size, however, with the
critical decision on entry yet to be made, may very well view the
presence of this belligerent giant in the market as reason enough for
deciding to risk their capital elsewhere. Whether real or imagined,
such fears can themselves constitute formidable barriers to entry,
barriers that permit the larger firms in a market to discipline the
smaller ones and compel them to follow along as prices are raised above
the competitive level.
VI. CONCLUSION
Several especially desirable features of the "structural" approach
to antitrust enforcement have already been mentioned, particularly its
be the most likely potential entrant - one with adequate funds, familiarity with the
technology, knowledge of the market, and perhaps a very substantial advantage over
all other potential entrants in terms of costs - may in fact be quite uninterested in
entering this market if the latter's profits, though well above the normal or "com-
petitive" level, are nonetheless below what this firm is earning in its other markets.
The possibility of earning twelve per cent after taxes might well induce entry by
a firm that is currently earning only ten per cent on its various investments, but
will hardly excite a firm that is earning, and expects to continue earning, at least
twenty per cent. In a sense, therefore, a firm's own super-competitive earnings in
other markets can themselves constitute a "barrier" to its entry into this one.
72. Dixon, supra note 45, at 991.
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relative efficiency, its maximum effectiveness with a minimum of en-
forcement resources, together with the accompanying minimization of
government interference in the management of business and thus the
enhancement of personal liberties. Brief mention was also made of
the fact that this approach tends to measure injury to competition
largely in terms of potentially higher prices and restricted output rather
than confining the inquiry to a search for injured competitors, a dif-
ference of emphasis that guards against the danger of forgetting this
broader aspect of the public interest. A number of other advantages
of this approach are perhaps inherent in 'the over-all discussion to this
point, but they deserve explicit recognition here.
One of the more familiar cries in antitrust enforcement is for
more "realism" and more "certainty." Commission and court decisions
that go against particular business practices are not infrequently criti-
cized as being economically unrealistic and, for that reason alone, so
inherently unpredictable that the business community could not have
reasonably anticipated the rule announced, no matter how diligently it
might have been laboring to keep itself in full compliance with the
requirements of antitrust. By "economically unrealistic" it is generally
meant that the decision in question has condemned a form of behavior
that, whatever its other features, was clearly consistent with profit-
maximization. Behavior that maximizes profits is, by definition, both
rational and realistic. It is "realistic" in that, among other things,
the prospects for keen observance of an antitrust order that commands
behavior inconsistent with it are not always particularly good. As one
commentator puts it, "business confidence that antitrust is leading to
results -that make some rudimentary economic sense is ... important
in stimulating voluntary compliance."' 73 Attempts to induce competitive
behavior in a market that is noncompetititively structured must neces-
sarily suffer this unhappy deficiency.
Similarly, rules of law prohibiting "unfair" business practices
can hardly be expected to avoid the charge of "uncertainty." So long
as business enterprises are following the ancient economic law of profit-
maximization in industries that are so structured as to deliver one
group of entrepreneurs in the power of another, the latter will always
be surprised and dismayed to learn that the law proposes to -take away
what that distorted structure gives.
The "barriers" approach can contribute a great deal to a lessening
of these misunderstandings. The members of concentrated industries
73. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts - From
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. Rzv. 285, 353 (1967).
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apparently have no difficulty following the idea that the imposition of
disadvantages on would-be competitors makes for a quieter life and
that the elimination of those handicaps would subject the industry's
established firms to all the hazards of a competitive existence, including
the necessity of lowering costs and prices. Moreover, the terms in
which entry barriers are measured - the degree to which prices can
be raised above a competitive level without inducing entry - are
nothing if not "realistic"; calculation of the entry-forestalling price is
one of the basic skills in which every significant firm in a concentrated
industry is expected to show considerable proficiency. A fairly per-
suasive case can thus be made -for the proposition that a rule of
law prohibiting the building of entry barriers, and providing for the
pulling down of those purposely thrown up, would add a sharp new note
of realism and certainty to antitrust.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, the structural ap-
proach itself offers two options for antitrust enforcement. The first is
the traditional remedy of "trust busting," a program of divestiture
and dissolution aimed at a direct elimination of the pricing power
inherent in the extremes of industry concentration. There are, how-
ever, a number of disadvantages in this approach, the principal one
being its impracticality. The nation has an enormous reservoir of
faith in the superiority of competition over monopoly (both single-firm
and collective), but that reservoir shows signs of running dry the
moment some "radical" proposes a wholesale breaking up of the
country's great oligopolies. Divestiture is considered by many to be
too "harsh" a solution to the problem.74
The other alternative offered by the "structuralists" would focus
primarily upon the "barriers" surrounding those industries and, where
feasible, upon efforts to lower them enough to restore the vigor of
competition in them. As Bain puts it: "[A] lteration of the condition
of entry might constitute a generally more feasible regulatory technique
than dissolution and dismemberment policies aimed just at reducing
seller concentration."75 One of the more obvious virtues of this ap-
proach is that, once the artificial barriers have been pulled down, the
"dissolution" or erosion of the large market shares held by the indus-
try's leaders is accomplished "naturally," by the entry of other business-
men and the gradual restoration of the competitive market's own
74. But see, Stigler, The Case Against Big Business, in MONOPOLY POWER AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3, 11 (Mansfield ed. 1964), cautioning that "inadequate
remedies for monopoly are 'harsh' treatment for the public interest."
75. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEw COMPETITION 208 (1956).
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incomparably "harsher" discipline, rather than by the blunter hand of
public authority.
In any event, however, there can be little real doubt that a
highly significant change has taken place in this area of the law.
Indeed, -it is hard to escape the conclusion that a distinct era, that of
an almost exclusive preoccupation with the "conduct" approach, is
drawing to a close and that another one, a predominantly "structural"
approach, is beginning. Under this new standard, conduct, where
relevant, would be evaluated not in isolation from the market context,
but against the background of, and indeed as a product of, the market
from which it grows and draws its sustenance.7 6 While there is a
superficial sense in which it remains as true today as it was a decade
ago that "legal requirements are prescribed by legislatures and courts,
not by economic science," ' 77 and that "the -law cannot, save in the most
obvious cases, assume that actual behavior in the marketplace will
in fact correspond to the pattern of competitive behavior that would
-theoretically be expected in a market of a given structure, "78 one might
well question whether such an observation would be particularly
meaningful in the wake of the Supreme Court's post-Brown Shoe
7
1
decisions, particularly its 1967 Clorox opinion."0 As Justice Harlan
observed in his concurring opinion there, the starting point in merger
litigation today is a rebuttable presumption "that the market operates
in accord with generally accepted principles of economic theory ... ",
and hence, that a prima facie violation of the antimerger statute has
been made out if it appears "reasonably probable that there will be a
change in market structure which will allow the exercise of substantially
greater market power .. ,"2 This last phrase - the reference to
changes in market structure that "allow" the exercise of more market
power - makes it abundantly clear that the "generally accepted eco-
nomic principles" referred to in the Justice's preceding phrase are those
of the "structuralists," not of those who would examine the wrong end
of the horn and pronounce markets "workably competitive" on no
other evidence than a sincere but unprovable conviction that they satisfy
76. See supra note 67.
77. ATT'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REi. 316 (1955).
78. Id. at 317.
79. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
80. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
81. Id. at 598 (concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.)
82. Id. at 599 (concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.)
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some ambiguous standard of economic "performance." Indeed, con-
sidering some of the inherent limitations of the "conduct" and "per-
formance" schools of antitrust, the more prudent policy may well turn
out to be one that, while emphasizing the barrier-lowering rather than
the dissolution remedy, nonetheless takes as its basic premise the notion
that "an industry which does not have a competitive structure will not
have competitive behavior."8
83. United States v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 426 (1956)
(dissenting opinion).
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